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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the use of informal credit as a coping strategy against risk by market 
women  in  the  city  of  Tamale,  Ghana.  Using  qualitative  research  techniques,  the  analysis 
reveals that intra-household structure and allocation decisions determine these market-based 
coping  strategies.  Market  women  invest  a  considerable  amount  of  working  hours  in 
maintaining  complex  credit  networks  as  a  safeguard  against  extreme  risks.  As  a  policy 
implication, this research suggests to provide market women with access to formal, reliable 
and long-term microfinance institutions, both to improve their ability to cope with risks and to 
reduce the risks they face.  
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1.  Introduction 
Microfinance has been  a major topic in both economic literature and  development policy 
during the last ten years. In Ghana, it is a key strategy to reduce poverty and is promoted by 
the international donor community, non-governmental organizations and the Government’s 
poverty  reduction  strategy.  However,  it  is  often  ignored  that  the  implementation  of 
microfinance  programs  in  Ghana  is  uneven  across  space  and  economic  sectors.  As  a 
consequence Ghana’s poor northern districts, including the city of Tamale, as well as market 
traders, especially female traders, are disadvantaged in the implementation of microfinance. 
Hence,  for  many  informal  sector  entrepreneurs,  the  only  financial  services  accessible  are 
informal finance.  
This  paper  addresses  the  case  of  market  women  located  in  the  Central  Market  of 
Tamale, northern Ghana, and analyzes the coping strategies market women employ to insure 
against risk. The mechanisms of market trade and inherent risk factors are examined, while 
the  impact  of  political  interventions  in  the  market  trade  in  the  past  is  also  considered. 
Furthermore,  informal  financial  services  are  analyzed  from  the  demand  side  of  market 
women,  pointing  out  advantages  and  disadvantages.  As  market  women  pursue  their 
businesses with the goal of satisfying the consumption needs of their household members, the 
interaction between market business and household appears to be important. Hence, the intra-
household decision-making processes and resource distribution are explicitly addressed. This 
paper builds on three branches of the literature – i.e. research on market women, on the 
informal financial sector, and on the household – and addresses current gaps.  
Qualitative fieldwork was conducted in Ghana for a period of three months in 2003. 
The choice of qualitative field work techniques was motivated by the need to understand 
existing constraints and risk factors that interfere with market women’s businesses, which can 
hardly be revealed by quantitative analysis. Qualitative data were gathered by combining the 
techniques of participant observation in the Tamale Central Market, narrative interviews, the 
recording  of  market  women’s  biographies,  focus  group  discussions  and  interviews  with 
experts of the microfinance sector.  
The  paper  has  three  main  findings.  First,  market  women  employ  informal  credit 
relationships as their main coping strategy to insure against risk in the case of a loss of capital. 
However, this comes at a cost, both in terms of time and interest. Second, informal credit is 
highly complex with respect to the types of providers, the amount of credit and the type of   3 
credit contract, ranging from commercial to reciprocal. Third, the design of intra-household 
allocation decisions appears to be a key determinant of market women’s coping strategies.  
The paper is outlined as follows: Section 2 summarizes recent literature this paper is 
built upon and points out some gaps. The following section presents the motivation of this 
paper, while section 4 presents some background information about the study site, the Tamale 
Central Market. The research questions are posed in section 5, while fieldwork methods are 
described  in  section  6.  The  three  key  results  are  presented  in  section  7.  The  last  section 
concludes and indicates policy implications.  
2.  Review of Recent Literature and Gaps 
This  paper  builds  on  three  branches  of  literature  of  the  fields  of  economics  and  social 
anthropology,  thus  cross-cutting  the  two  disciplines.  The  first  concerns  market  women  in 
Ghana.  Besides  agriculture,  non-farm  self-employment  is  the  second  most  important 
employment sector in Ghana, especially for women, and hosted 33.8 percent of the adult 
population in 1998 (McKay and Aryeetey, 2004: 19). However, only a limited number of 
studies have focused on market women in Ghana. These include empirical studies on market 
women  in  Accra  (Robertson,  1976,  1983,  1995,  Rocksloh-Papendieck,  1992,  Westwood, 
1984, Dinan, 1977, Campbell, 1985) and on Asante market women in Kumasi (Clark, 1989, 
1991, 1994, Clark and Manuh, 1991). A common topic of these empirical studies is their 
focus on the effects of the economic crisis of the early 1980s on coping strategies of market 
women. While market women were accused by government officials of pilling goods and 
worsening the economic crisis, most of the cited studies point out that, on the contrary, market 
women were severely affected by the economic crisis. This was specifically found to hold 
true  for  market  women  at  the  lower  end  of  the  trade  hierarchy.  Further,  several  authors 
analyzed the impact of structural adjustment programs on market women (Clark, 1994, Clark 
and  Manuh,  1991,  Manuh,  1994),  finding  that  despite  a  changed  political  and  economic 
framework, market women were still disadvantaged.  
The literature on market women in Ghana appears to have two gaps. First, all of the 
above-cited studies focused on cities located in southern and central Ghana. Given the fact 
that  Ghana  is  characterized  by  a  severe  north-south  division,  where  the  north  is  more 
disadvantaged (see section 3), research on market women in northern Ghana is an important 
means of identifying causes of persistent poverty in this region. Second, there has not been 
any recent study. Field research indicated that stereotypes and negative perceptions of market   4 
women persist today, often overestimating market women’s income. Hence, there is a need to 
point out constraints, risk factors and poverty traps inherent to market trade today.  
The second branch of literature concerns the informal finance sector in developing 
countries. Recent research on informal finance has pointed out its persistence in areas where 
formal  finance  is  accessible,  and  where  it  is  the  sole  source  of  finance.  A  variety  of 
explanations are offered for this phenomenon. Some authors identified push-factors of formal 
finance,  such  as  credit  rationing  (Bell  et  al.,  1997,  Mushinski,  1999),  the  institutional 
weaknesses of microfinance programs (Tsai, 2004) and tightly scheduled repayment schemes 
of  microfinance  programs  (Jain  and  Mansuri,  2003).  Another  explanation  might  be  pull-
factors  of  informal  finance.  The  latter  include  its  advantageous  characteristics,  such  as 
flexibility and convenience (Sanderatne, 2003), lower transaction costs (Kochar, 1997) and 
the  supply  of  custom  tailored  financial  products  (Baydas  et  al.,  1995).  A  further  area  of 
research has focused on the function of informal credit to provide insurance against risk of 
poverty (Udry, 1990, Bardhan and Udry, 1999: 94-109, Boucher and Guirkinger, 2005). 
With respect to Ghana, a variety of programs are currently being implemented to offer 
microfinance services to poor households, while only recently has attention been paid to the 
diverse informal finance sector. Furthermore, the few studies that focus on informal finance in 
Ghana rather undertake a technical description of various providers in terms of interest rates 
charged  or  their  institutional  structure  (e.g.,  Steel  and  Andah,  2003,  Aryeetey  and  Udry, 
1995). What lacks is an analysis of the demand perspective on informal finance that compares 
advantages,  disadvantages,  and  function  of  diverse  informal  finance  services.  Such  an 
analysis would also provide indications on poor households’ need for financial products that 
may be indicative to the design of microfinance programs as well.  
Third, there has been a long tradition of research on the household as an economic 
unit. An early contribution to this field of literature is Chayanov’s peasant farm model (1966, 
orig. 1923). Chayanov’s basic argument holds that households, quiet different from formal 
enterprises, adapt their agricultural production output to the consumption needs of household 
members. As a consequence, a household’s production (or income) changes according to the 
ratio of dependent to non-dependent household members during a family’s life cycle. Intra-
household issues became a topic of research since Wilk’s seminal work on Peru (1989, 1990, 
1993), in which he rejects the implicit assumptions of altruism, generalized reciprocity and 
pooling of income commonly held in the household literature, such as Sahlins (1974) and 
Wallerstein (1984). Instead, Wilk assumes that "all motives are mixed; total self-interest is as 
rare as pure altruism" (1993: 208) and proposes to consider processes of decision-making as   5 
well as resource flows between household members. For the case of Peru, Wilk shows that the 
allocation of decision-making power among household members is an important determinant 
of  a  household’s  economic  success.  Recent  literature  on  intra-household  allocation  has 
focused on inter-generational transfers (Gosling and Karagiannaki, 2004, Suen et al., 2003) 
and investment decisions regarding children’s education (Liu and Hsu, 2004, Bhalotra, 2004). 
The effects of gender as a variable in intra-household allocation have been incorporated in the 
analysis through a gender wage gap (Albanesi and Olivetti, 2005) and through time-allocation 
between spouses (Browning and Lechene, 2001).  
While  literature  on  the  household  and  intra-household  issues  is  extensive,  little  is 
known  about  the  interplay  between  intra-household  structure  and  households’  coping 
strategies.  Intra-household  structure  is  understood  in  the  following  to  include  both  the 
composition of household membership and the allocation of decision-making power.  
3.  Motivation: Why focusing on market women in northern Ghana? 
Market women in Northern Ghana are a social group highly vulnerable to poverty. There are 
three reasons for that. First, poverty in Ghana, as in most developing countries, is gender 
related. At an aggregate national level, women face higher levels of deprivation compared to 
men  (McKay  and  Aryeetey,  2004:  12).  As  reliable  data  for  men  and  women  concerning 
income  are  difficult  to  derive,  education  factors  may  serve  as  poverty  indications  across 
genders. Table 1 summarizes education indicators across genders in the Northern Region in 
1997. Comparing literacy rates of adults and primary and secondary school enrollment, the 
table shows that men outnumber women in all three categories, while the gender gap is largest 
in adult literary rates.  
Second, as mentioned above, market women have been victims of state repression in 
the past. In a general environment of rising consumer prices and shortages of goods since the 
1960s, which further deteriorated in the late 1970s, government officials hold market women 
responsible  for  the  crisis.  According  to  Robertson,  "the  market  women,  because  of  their 
visible role, were forced to bear the brunt of public displeasure provoked by shortages in 
goods,  invisible  inflation,  decline  in  terms  of  trade,  corruption,  and  incompetence" 
(Robertson, 1983: 469). The military Government, under J.J. Rawlings, took the most radical 
steps against market women, including publicly punishing them for price control violations 
and  the  confiscation  of  their  goods  and  private  property.  Further,  a  politicized  mob  was 
encouraged  by  soldiers  to  set  markets  on  fire  nationwide  between  1979  and  1982.  This   6 
included the Tamale Central Market, which was burned down completely in February 1982, 
causing the disruption of the market trade for several years.  
Many of the market women in business suffered a complete loss of their property in 
goods and of their capital in cash, which many traders used to store in their stalls overnight. 
The material loss, in addition to emotional stress and fear for life, caused many of the older 
traders to  withdraw  from the field altogether.  Thus, it was often the  daughters of former 
market women that took over the market in the late 1980s, starting with little or no capital at 
all. Local politicians involved themselves in the redistribution of lots in the Tamale Central 
Market, favoring their beneficiaries. As a result, market traders formed a heterogeneous group 
as  compared  to  the  situation  before  the  burning  of  the  market.  In  sum,  the  repression  of 
market women has two implications for the situation today: First, there is evidence that the 
repression of market women has caused a path dependence, as many of them had to start over 
from scratch, losing the opportunity to profit from economies of scale in the purchase of 
goods.  Second,  local  authorities  and  bank  employees  expressed  their  rather  negative 
perceptions regarding market women during interviews, which is reflected in their reluctance 
to assist market women.  
The  third  reason  for  northern  market  women's  vulnerability  to  poverty  is  Ghana's 
strong  and  pertinent  north-south  divide,  a  common  feature  of  West  African  countries 
bordering  the  Atlantic  Ocean.  Market  women  of  the  city  of  Tamale,  the  capital  of  the 
Northern Region, live in one of the less developed regions of the country. Ghana’s north, 
consisting  of  the  Northern,  Upper  East  and  Upper  West  Regions,  is  disadvantaged  as 
compared to the rest of the country in terms of an unfavorable climate, sparse population 
density,  and  a  low  degree  of  industrial  production.  Stewart  and  Lange  (2006)  consider 
Ghana’s  north-south  divide  as  a  "persistent  horizontal  inequality,"  arguing  that  a  strong 
between  group  inequality  exists  across  regions.  According  to  them,  Ghana’s  north  is 
characterized by a higher portion of poor households that remain poor over time. Table 2 
summarizes indicators of inequalities across regions in the 1990s. The table shows that the 
incidence of poverty increased in the Northern Region between 1992 and 1997, while the 
national  average  decreased  over  the  same  time  period;  the  regional  gap  hence  widened. 
Furthermore, access to health services and primary school enrollment are significantly lower 
in  the  Northern  Region  as  compared  to  the  national  average  in  1997.  Similar  results  are 
presented by McKay and Aryeetey (2004), who provide evidence that Ghana has reduced 
poverty in absolute terms over the last 20 years, while north-south inequalities have increased 
slightly.  These  socio-economic  inequalities  are  paralleled  by  cultural  divides,  as  Ghana’s   7 
south is predominantly Christian while the population in the north is predominantly Muslim. 
Further, Ghana’s northern and southern regions have been subject to different influences both 
in the pre-colonial and the colonial period.  
4.  Case study background: The Tamale Central Market  
Tamale is home to almost 300,000 inhabitants, 80 percent of which belong to the ethnic group 
of  Dagomba  (Tamale  Municipal  Assembly  2003:  2).  About  85  percent  of  Tamale’s 
inhabitants are Muslim (ibid. 5). The city’s economy is characterized by its function as a hub 
in the national road network. As such, Tamale serves as a central point for the aggregation, 
storage and transportation of the agricultural output of Ghana’s northern districts into the 
densely populated south.  
Today, agriculture is only practiced in the outskirts of Tamale, making it necessary for 
men and women to earn income through either wage labor or self-employment. Still, wage 
labor is a limited option for many residents of Tamale, because it generally requires formal 
education and offers only few job opportunities. For example, Tamale hosts only two large-
sized and three medium-sized registered enterprises (Tamale Municipal Assembly 2003: 4). 
Thus,  self-employment  is  the  main  occupation  of  both  men  and  women  with  less  formal 
education.  For  women,  market  trade  is  an  important  and  often  the  only  accessible 
employment sector. As a consequence, about 95 percent of the market traders in the Tamale 
Central Market are female.  
Tamale has three types of permanent markets: First, there is one large market designed 
to accommodate large truckloads of agricultural produce. Second, the Central Market is the 
oldest market in Tamale. Lying in the center of the town, this market supplies the city’s 
population with consumption goods including foods, clothing, household items, medicine and 
services such as hairdressing, telecommunications and local healers. Finally, there are so-
called neighborhood markets in all quarters of Tamale. These provide a small range of fresh 
and canned foods, beverages and everyday supplies.  
A striking observation is the segmentation of the Tamale Central Market traders into 
three main categories: (1) Hawkers – teenage girls or young women trading goods in very 
small  quantities,  either  by  walking  around  or  by  supplying  the  goods  from  the  floor.  (2) 
Market women – established traders, mostly women, selling their goods from a fixed stall 
inside the market. (3) Wholesalers – specialized traders, both men and women, organizing the 
transportation of goods to Tamale, and maintaining business ties with market women, but   8 
rarely  with  consumers.  This  segmentation  goes  along  with  broad  categories  of  capital 
endowment in which hawkers have very small capital endowments, usually less than 20 Euro. 
Market women have a capital endowment of about equivalent of 100 to 500 Euros, whereas 
wholesalers operate with a capital of 2,000 Euro or more. Interestingly, the segmentation into 
these  categories  appeared  to  be  strict,  causing  trades  to  cluster  around  the  three  main 
categories.  Thus,  an  underlying  mechanism  seems  to  function  as  a  poverty  trap,  causing 
difficulties for traders who wish to cross the lines between these categories.  
5.  Research Questions  
Market women are vulnerable to poverty as their average income from trade is low. Statistics 
reveal that 27 percent of all traders nationwide, including wholesale and retail trade, lived 
below the poverty line in 1997 (McKay and Aryeetey, 2004: 20). Also, market women face 
risk factors in market trade that pose a consistent threat to their capital, and hence their ability 
to generate income. The first research question therefore is: How do market women cope with 
risk factors inherent in market trade?  
Similar to many other informal sector entrepreneurs, most market women do not have 
access to the formal financial sector. As a consequence, a diverse informal finance sector has 
developed in Ghana. The second research question asks: What informal finance services are 
accessible to market women, and what functions do these services have?  
Market women in the city of Tamale live in different types of household settings that 
vary according to the marital status of women. As mentioned above, several studies have 
pointed  out  the  effects  of  different  intra-household  structures  on  a  household’s  economic 
success. Building on this literature, the third research question holds: What is the impact of 
different intra-household structures on the coping strategies of market women?  
6.  Fieldwork Methods 
Empirical  fieldwork  was  conducted  from  August  to  October  2003  in  Tamale  and  Accra. 
During  field  research,  different  qualitative  techniques  were  combined.  According  to 
Malinowski’s  (1922)  guideline  for  anthropological  fieldwork,  participant  observation  was 
carried out in the Tamale Central Market, thus gathering information on the functioning of 
market trade. Further, following an approach proposed by Girtler (2001), extensive narrative 
interviews  with  ten  female  and  three  male  traders  of  the  Tamale  Central  Market  were   9 
conducted.  About  half  of  the  interviews  were  held  in  English,  while  a  research  assistant 
interpreted the remaining interviews from Dagbani, Twi and Hausa into English. The average 
length  of  interviews  was  between  30  and  90  minutes;  about  half  of  them  recorded  and 
transcribed. Further, the life history of three market women was recorded. Given the fact that 
these three women had a good command of English, the field data may entail a bias towards 
more educated market women. Another technique consisted of focus group discussions with 
four associations of market traders in Tamale, including the "Sugulo Mali Nyori Association," 
"Biakoye  Youth  Association,"  Smock  Weavers’  Association"  and  "Denani  Youth 
Association." Lastly, key experts of the microfinance sector as well as executives of financial 
institutions in both Tamale and Accra were interviewed.  
The  strength  of  the  qualitative  methods  applied  during  fieldwork  consist  of  their 
ability to reveal profound structures and mechanisms of market trade and further to account 
for cultural variables that are difficult to measure otherwise, such as the determinants of social 
standing. Quantitative methods of data gathering were not employed, as market women did 
not  feel  confident  to  reveal  their  business  data  in  questionnaires.  This  is  due  to  strict 
enforcement of price controls by state authorities in the past. Hence, the research results are 
not  representative  in  a  narrow  statistical  sense  but  given  the  extensive  fieldwork,  the 
qualitative  results  are  likely  to  be  indicators  of  general  trends.  Further  quantitative  work 
remains  to  be  done  on  this  issue  in  collecting  household-  and  firm-level  data.  Data 
requirements for such an analysis are very high due to the need to combine intra-household 
data with firm-level data from market women’s enterprise.  
7. Results 
In the following, each of the three research questions is addressed in turn.  
7.1 Informal lending as a coping strategy 
The nature of their activities implies that market women are facing risk that entails the danger 
of a loss of capital. Market women are affected by risk both at an individual and an aggregate 
level, while risk can have low and high impact on their businesses. Risk that occurs at an 
individual level can be prevented, in contrast to risk affecting all market women. A loss of 
capital or of labor is the worst-case scenario for market women, having a high impact on their 
businesses.  A  loss  of  capital  can  occur  as  a  result  of  shocks  in  trade,  such  as  theft  or   10 
confiscation of goods, or high expenses in the household, such as costs for medication and 
school fees. Illness of a market woman or her household members may cause a shortage of 
labor. Risks that are low in impact include the failure to collect payments for goods that 
market women sell on credit to their costumers, the failure to recover money lent to kinsmen, 
and the breakdown of the relationship to a wholesaler who provides a market woman with 
goods on credit. Examples for aggregate risk are the shutting down of the Tamale Central 
Market by local authorities due to sanitary issues, the imposition of taxes on traders, and a 
loss of money due to failed applications for group credit programs.  
In short, a common experience of market women during their professional history is 
the decline of their trading business at some point in time. Because the goal of their economic 
enterprise is to fulfill the needs of their households in both short-term and long-term respects, 
market women may not allow their enterprise to go bankrupt at times when the total revenue 
is negative. Instead, they have to develop coping strategies that minimize risk and facilitate 
the reconstruction of their enterprise after a total loss.  
The first finding is that market women use informal lending  as their  main coping 
strategy.  Like  other  informal  sector  entrepreneurs,  they  have  limited  or  no  access  to  the 
formal  financial  sector,  including  commercial  banks  and  formal  microfinance  programs. 
There are two reasons for this: First, as mentioned above, various Governments used market 
women as scapegoats for the economic deterioration. Even though direct interference of the 
state in markets decreased since the 1990s, it was observed during field research that there is 
still official reluctance to assist market women. Second, compared to other Ghanaian cities, 
Tamale is less developed in terms of infrastructure and supply of services, including financial 
services. Hence, market women have only access to the informal financial sector. Informal 
credit relationships mainly serve as insurance against emergencies, whereas those are rarely 
used to enlarge investments in trading business, as the volume of informal credit is relatively 
low compared to the average capital of most market women. Instead, informal credit helps to 
smooth income, given the fact that market women spend the bigger part of their income from 
trade on satisfying the consumption needs of their households.  
The engaging in and maintaining of a variety of informal credit relationships bears 
considerable cost both in terms of time and interest. Market women invest about one third of 
their working hours consolidating personal ties to the providers of informal credit. Further, 
they aim at continuously borrowing and repaying, thereby following two objectives. On the 
one  hand,  in  following  the  time  scheme  of  repayment,  market  women  communicate 
information on the reliability of their business skills and their cash flows to the informal credit   11 
provider. On the other hand, they continuously build up a moral obligation of the informal 
credit provider of granting them credit in tight situations.  
Market women have individual ties to the providers of informal credit but also aim at 
accessing credit through groups, locally called associations. The existence of associations in 
all  aspects  of  social  life  is  an  existential  feature  of  Ghanaian  culture;  they  are  especially 
prominent  in  market  trade.  However,  the  character  of  traders’  associations  has  changed 
fundamentally within the past ten years. In the past, associations mainly served to gather the 
traders of certain goods and branches, to organize the transportation of goods into the Tamale 
Central Market, to set price arrangements and to represent traders’ interests vis-à-vis local 
authorities. Today, many associations set their highest priority as accessing group credits from 
the formal financial sector. There were even indicators of an abrupt rise in the formation of 
new associations in Tamale with the sole goal of qualifying for group credits. This shifting of 
associations’ agendas coincided with the introduction of semi-formal microfinance schemes 
by a growing number of non-governmental organizations in Tamale since the mid 1990s, all 
of  which  followed  the  methodology  of  group  lending.  Thus,  market  women  spend  a 
considerable  amount  of  working  hours  in  attending  weekly  or  fortnightly  meetings  of 
associations.  Most  market  women  hold  membership  in  multiple  associations,  which  also 
implies the payment of monthly fees meant to serve as a loan security in formal microfinance 
programs. However, in contrast to their engagement, only a minor number of associations in 
Tamale have been successful in accessing credit from microfinance schemes. The persistent 
engagement of market women to access formal microfinance programs mirrors two aspects: 
First, formal microfinance offers the opportunity for borrowing larger credits which market 
women may use to invest in their actual business, thus enhancing their working capital. In 
contrast, informal lending is rather small in  volume and merely serves as insurance after 
businesses collapse. Second, market women actively and persistently form associations and 
apply for group credits because attempts of individual market women to access credit from 
commercial banks are futile.  
Furthermore, market women take over leadership positions in functions both related to 
the market, and in other social activities. These include the committee for conflict mediation 
in  tax  issues,  and  religious  organizations  or  neighborhood  associations,  respectively.  This 
engagement  gives  proof  of  their  respectable  social  status  and  trustworthiness  and  thereby 
underlines their creditworthiness. At the same time they gather information on trade related 
issues, including political actions of the Tamale Municipal Assembly, activities and programs 
of  non-governmental  organizations  in  Tamale,  the  condition  of  national  roads  and   12 
transportation capacities, price increases in cities of the south due to inflation or the ongoing 
conflict  on  the  traditional  political  leadership  of  the  Dagomba  that  caused  a  state  of 
emergency, which in turn restricted traveling and the transportation of goods. Thus, the time 
that market women spend on association meetings and other social activities serves various 
purposes and therefore lowers the transaction costs of informal credit.  
Other coping strategies of market women to handle risk, although less important than 
informal credit networks, include the diversification of goods offered in the market in order to 
realize predictable everyday cash-flows and the investment in the education of their children 
as a long-term security for their old-age.  
7.2  Complexity of informal finance 
The second finding is that market women have ties to a variety of informal credit providers, 
not limited to the financial sector. This section assesses the organization and characteristics of 
these various providers and identifies the underlying motivation of market women.  
Specialized informal finance providers, locally called Susu Collectors, supply poor 
households  with  short-term  and  flexible  financial  products.  Susu  Collectors  have  a  long 
tradition  in  Ghana,  while  their  financial  services  are  still  popular  among  informal  sector 
entrepreneurs and peasants today. This is indicated by the high number of Susu Collectors 
operating in Ghana (in total 4.032 in 2003), serving each between 100 and 250 customers in 
rural and urban areas, respectively (see table 3). Commonly, market women have to save with 
a Susu Collector for several months in order to give proof of their trustworthiness, as well as 
their daily cash flows, before they are allowed to borrow. According to the methodology, the 
Susu Collector visits his customer’s business location everyday for a period of 31 days and 
collects  a  fixed  amount  of  money,  ranging  between  0.50  and  1  Euro,  depending  on  the 
customer’s  cash  flows.  The  daily  contributions  of  a  costumer  are  recorded  in  a  savings 
passport. After 31 days, the aggregated amount is paid out to the customer as a lump sum, 
while the Susu Collector keeps one day’s contribution as a fee for his services. The Susu 
Collector earns an additional income from either reinvesting his costumers’ contributions in 
short-term projects or from depositing the contributions at a commercial bank, thus receiving 
positive interest out of the savings account. In contrast, market women who take advantage of 
the Susu Collector’s savings services do not receive a compensation for inflation, nor do they 
get any positive interest. However, the same methodology and the same fees incurred when a 
Susu Collector grants a credit to a customer. An amount of money, often drawn out of other   13 
customers’ daily contributions, is given to a market woman at the beginning of a Susu cycle 
and repaid through daily Susu contributions afterwards.  
Market women  generally  appreciate the confidentiality of the Susu savings, which 
may  be  secure  against  the  claims  of  other  household  members.  Also  important  is  the 
discipline to save that is forced onto them by the Susu Collector. However, the main reason 
for market women to engage in a relationship with a Susu Collector seems to be the prospect 
of accessing credit in the case of emergency. The volume of both Susu savings and credit is 
rather low compared to the average capital of market women at times of usual business. Still, 
the volume of credit provided by a Susu Collector is sufficient for market women to restart 
their business after a collapse and further helps to satisfy the consumption needs of their 
household members until income from trade is restored.  
Saving  with  Susu  Collectors  can  be  a  risk,  as  Susu  Collectors  are  not  subject  to 
regulation. During the field research, two Susu Collectors operating in Tamale went bankrupt. 
In both cases, Susu Collectors collapsed because they were unable to retrieve credits that they 
had  given  out  to  some  customers  out  of  the  daily  savings  contributions  of  others.  As  a 
consequence, more than 300 market women lost both their savings and the opportunity to 
borrow.  
A further category of informal providers of credit are wholesalers, who grant credits in 
goods to market women. Even though no interest is charged explicitly, the goods have to be 
repaid  at  prices  per  unit  that  are  about  15  percent  above  the  purchase  market  price,  a 
considerable fee. While credits in goods from wholesalers are the most important type of 
informal credit after a total loss, this credit relationship reinforces the polarization between 
market women and wholesalers. This is further emphasized by the fact that most wholesalers 
are located at Kumasi, Ghana’s second largest city. Wholesalers of Kumasi generally are of 
different ethnic origin, speak a different language and are mostly Christian.  
Market women also maintain mutual obligations that include credit to other market 
women. It is common for market women to gather in Susu Groups, referred to as Rotating 
Savings and Credit Associations in the literature (Geertz, 1962 provides an early analysis). 
Ranging between five to more than 200 members, Susu Groups meet along a fixed schedule, 
such as every five days, weekly or fortnightly. At the meetings, every member contributes a 
fixed amount of money into a common pool, which is handed over as a lump sum to one 
member  at  a  time.  This  process  continues  until  one  credit  cycle  is  completed,  i.e.  each 
member of the Susu Group received the lump sum one time. Each Susu Group has its own 
customs for the succession of the distribution of money. These include the seniority principle,   14 
a lottery or personal needs of members. The lump sum functions as a credit that members 
repay through their contributions until the end of the credit cycle. Yet for the individual who 
receives the lump sum last, it is similar to her aggregated savings.  
Lastly,  market  women  have  credit  ties  with  relatives  both  inside  and  outside  the 
household. Again, the volume of these credits is rather small for the ongoing trading business. 
These credits, both monetary and in kind, become important mostly in emergencies when they 
help satisfy the needs of household members. While generally neither interest nor fees are 
charged, ties to relatives are based on generalized and balanced reciprocity, depending on the 
degree of kinship. Good reputation again serves as credit collateral in all types of reciprocal 
credit relationships.  
In short, market women maintain a surprisingly complex network of informal finance 
providers who differ considerably in terms of types of providers, fees, and volume of credit. 
Informal finance may include savings or credit or both, it may be monetary or in kind, and it 
may involve operators of different geographical localities and of different social standing. 
Furthermore, credit contracts range from reciprocity to commercial finance. Market women 
aim at combining multiple savings and credit contracts in order to reinsure their access to 
informal credit in the case of emergency. This is due to the fact that informal credit providers 
themselves may be subject to risk – some face the same risk than market women, while others 
are influenced by rather different risk factors.  
The finding that different segments of the informal credit market are used to serve 
different purposes is in line with other recent research. As such, Aryeetey and Udry (1995) 
find in their study on Ghana that "the variation in the types of informal financial units derives 
from the fact that such units are purpose-oriented" (p. 23). Barslund and Tarp (2006: 6-8) 
show  that  in  the  setting  of  rural  Vietnam,  formal  credits  are  merely  used  for  enhancing 
production as well as asset accumulation, while informal credits are more likely used in the 
case of household shocks or unforeseen events, such as health expenditures. Moreover, this 
result is in accordance with the findings of Udry (1990) and Boucher and Guirkinger (2005), 
who argue that informal finance functions as an insurance against risk. However, this paper 
contrasts with Kocher’s study (1997) that pointed out low transaction costs as a feature of 
informal  finance.  Rather,  this  paper  reveals  that  informal  credit  entails  considerable 
transaction costs in terms of working hours and interest, while the latter differs between credit 
providers.  However,  market  women  are  able  to  incur  these  transaction  costs  as  their 
subsistence mode of production implies that their shadow wage is very low.    15 
7.3   Intra-Household Allocation and Coping Strategies 
The following section examines the impact of different intra-household settings on market 
women’s vulnerability to risk inherent to trade. In Tamale, four types of household settings 
that relate to an individual’s marital status occur:  
1.  Households consisting of a monogamous couple, their children, and possibly other 
relatives,  
2.  households consisting of a polygamous couple, including one husband and two or 
more wives, their children, and possibly other relatives, 
3.  female-headed households consisting of a polygamously married wife, who lives 
with her children and possibly other relatives in a separate household from her 
husband, and 
4.  female-headed households consisting of a divorced, separated or widowed woman, 
her children, and possibly other relatives.  
In  general,  children  may  be  either  a  biological  child  or  a  foster  child  (a  common 
practice in West Africa). Thus, the household is a flexible concept in the local context: While 
it comprises individuals who do not belong to the nuclear family of a married couple and their 
biological  children,  not  all  spouses  of  a  polygamous  marriage  may  live  jointly  in  one 
household.  
It is generally not very common in northern Ghana for spouses to pool their income. 
Rather, they pursue separate economic activities and keep their incomes separate in order to 
pay  for  the  household  expenses  traditionally  assigned  to  their  status  (see  Clark,  1994, 
Robertson, 1976). It has also been pointed out that husbands and wives also participate in 
separate insurance networks (Udry and Conley, 2004).  
In the Dagomba society, to which the majority of Tamale’s population belongs to, it is 
traditionally  the  responsibility  of  the  husband  to  provide  shelter  and  stable  food,  such  as 
maize, yams and cassava, for his household. Wives, on the other hand, are obliged to grow 
vegetables and spices as supplements for the dishes and raise small livestock.  
Today, not only the sources of income, but also the types of expenses, have altered 
compared to the traditional Dagomba ideal of agricultural homesteads. Further, it is striking 
that spouses in most cases do not join for pursuing one trading business, even if both spouses 
operate trading businesses within the same market. About half of Tamale’s population now 
lives  in  houses  made  out  of  cement  or  sandcrete  (Tamale  Municipal  Assembly  2003:  7), 
implying  considerable  costs  of  construction.  Further,  electricity,  water,  and  gas  cartridges   16 
have to be paid for. Lastly, there are expenses for children’s education, including tuition fees, 
school materials and uniforms.  
As a consequence, husbands and wives often get into conflict over their contribution to 
the household budget. All married market women that were interviewed during field research 
stated unanimously that their husbands provided for housing and for stable cereals, while 
market women regarded it to be in their own responsibility to buy vegetables, meat, and 
clothing for themselves and their children. In contrast, there are several practices to pay for 
electricity, water, and gas. Wives who live in separate households in polygamous marriages 
generally  were  the  most  disadvantaged.  Further,  spouses  struggle  over  general  household 
implements, especially kitchen utensils and children’s education expenses. The latter caused 
the most severe conflicts in polygamous marriages, where wives competed for the benefits of 
their own children.  
Lastly, there are different common practices regarding the husband’s contribution to 
the evening meal. In monogamous marriages, it is the wife who prepares the evening meal for 
all household members, while wives in polygamous marriages often cook the evening meal 
separately for themselves and their children. In the latter case, the husband takes his meal 
from one wife at a time. While most husbands were reported to contribute a small amount of 
money daily to help the women pay for the ingredients (locally called "chop money"), market 
women were in general not satisfied with the amount they received. This was especially true 
for market women living in polygamous marriages, who only receive a contribution from 
their husband the particular day he eats with that wife. However, husbands generally hold 
more bargaining power in conflicts concerning the distribution of responsibilities within the 
household for several reasons. Due to their higher social standing, ascribed to them by both 
religion and cultural norms, it is easier for men to have a divorce than women. In addition, it 
is  easier  for  men  to  remarry  younger  women.  Further,  men  tend  to  be  more  mobile 
geographically, often leaving their children with their mothers or other relatives. Migration to 
the  south  has  been  appealing  for  men  from  Tamale  since  the  colonial  era,  due  to  better 
employment opportunities in plantations, mining, and the informal sector of the capital Accra 
(cf. Hart, 1973: 88). The marital history of market women interviewed during field research 
indicated that marriages were rather unstable over time, despite Islamic customs.  
Spouses not only struggle over intra-household responsibilities, but they also compete 
over the labor of their children. As mentioned above, market women invest about one third of 
their working hours in the maintenance of relationships and social networks as a strategy of 
securing their enterprise against a total loss. Market women thus have to rely on assistants to   17 
carry on with the business during their absence. Preferably, this would be done by their own 
children,  who  at  the  same  time  acquire  the  skills  of  trading.  While  the  market  hours  are 
between 9 am and 6 pm daily, with the most turnover between 11 am and 2 pm, market 
women are free to determine their presence in the market. However, it is especially important 
for those offering  relatively  expensive goods with rather infrequent  cash flows to regular 
costumers to keep their stalls open for long hours. Children also act in place of market women 
during the Muslim prayers. During this time market women leave their stalls to either pray at 
the mosque within the market or even leave to visit a mosque in town.  
Great importance is attached to the proper preparation of evening meals, which is an 
important feature of a respectable social status for Dagomba women. The traditional local 
dishes  consist  of  Fufu  –  cooked,  mashed  and  pounded  yams  and  cassava  –  or  Banku  – 
dumplings made out of fermented maize. Both Fufu and Banku are served with a sauce of 
vegetables, meat or fish. The manual mashing of yams requires great physical strength, while 
it is also extremely time-consuming. However, both the preparation and the eating of meals, 
often  with  guests,  take  place  in  the  courtyard.  Therefore,  the  way  a  woman  handles  her 
cooking duties communicates information concerning her traditional values and respectability 
to guests, neighbors and passers-by. Market women have diverse strategies to both maximize 
their working hours in the market while at the same time fulfilling their social duties. Most 
often, a market woman sends one daughter home to start preparing the meal by 3 pm, while 
she herself continues with business until 5 pm and merely does the finish of the dish, such as 
adding the final flavors. In contrast, lunch and even breakfast are not prepared at home, but 
bought in the market. Hence, a line of industry developed within the Tamale Central Market 
that specialized in catering snacks and beverages for market women.  
In short, children play a prominent role as assistants to their mothers in both household 
duties and market trade. However, it appeared that school enrollment was much higher among 
children of market women as compared to school enrollment rates for Tamale of 85.3 and 
52.6  percent  at  primary  and  junior  secondary  schools  respectively  (Tamale  Municipal 
Assembly 2003: 4). Market women consider an investment in the education of their children 
as a long-term security against sickness in their old age. This strategy is even more plausible 
given  the  fact  that  neither  pension  schemes  nor  secure  long-term  savings  services  are 
available to market women. Market women have no alternative but to rely on inter-generation 
contracts, building on a long-term generalized reciprocity. Hence, it is popular for market 
women without children, or for those with only a few children, to adopt foster children from 
kinsmen. While market women not only assume responsibility to nourish and dress foster   18 
children, it is also common to bear the expense of the children’s education. In turn, foster 
children help out in the market enterprise and have a moral obligation to care for their foster 
mothers at old age.  
To conclude, the design of the intra-household structure exerts a substantial influence 
on market women’s ability to cope with risk. Women heading their own households may 
decide autonomously on deploying their children’s labor as well as monetary inputs, thus 
combining  production  and  consumption  decisions  similar  to  peasant  households  (see 
Chayanov, 1966). These techniques allow women who head their households to make optimal 
use of business opportunities. This holds true even though those market women have to bear 
all  expenses  of  the  household  out  of  their  income  from  trade.  Further,  as  those  women 
exercise decision power over the distribution of the household budget, they may invest more 
in their children’s education. However, there are strict requirements for women who head and 
nourish  their  own  households.  These  include  a  minimum  capital  of  about  500  Euro,  the 
command over their children’s labor to assist in trade and household duties, experience in 
trade, and social capital to maintain extensive informal credit networks. Assuming that these 
conditions are present, field research indicates that market women living in female-headed 
households have better abilities to cope with risk, thus being less vulnerable to poverty. While 
about 22.3 percent of urban households in the Northern Region were female-headed in 1997 
(Government  Statistical  Service  2001),  clearly  not  all  female-headed  households  fulfilled 
these conditions. However, this finding is rather contrary to the poverty literature that often 
finds female-headed households to belong to the most deprived categories of households.  
In contrast, market women who share a household with their husband may not freely 
deploy  either  their  children’s  labor  or  monetary  inputs  to  best  respond  to  business 
opportunities. Consequently, as they are more likely to encounter constraints in pursuing their 
trading enterprise, those market women have fewer capabilities and resources to invest in 
coping strategies. As a result, they are more vulnerable to poverty. As these women only 
exercise less decision-making authority than their husband, these women have the incentive to 
minimize their contribution to the household budget. Saving with Susu Collectors is a popular 
strategy of market women to hide their daily cash flow from household members. As a result 
of this household structure, the standard of living between spouses of a polygamous marriage 
may differ to a certain degree according to each spouse’s success in business.    19 
8.  Conclusions 
This paper explored the functions and characteristics of informal credit as a coping strategy in 
the economy of market women in the Central Market of Tamale, Ghana. Using qualitative 
research techniques, the paper revealed that market women use informal credit as their main 
coping strategy against risk. A second finding is that informal finance accessible to market 
women is complex in terms of types of providers, interest, and volume of credit. Given that 
the volume of informal credit is relatively low compared to the average working capital of 
market women, informal credit is less useful in the ongoing business. As a third finding, the 
intra-household budget system was identified to be a determinant for market women’s ability 
to cope with risk, which in turn has an impact on their vulnerability to poverty. 
Three policy implications can be derived from this research: First, there is a demand 
for micro insurance schemes which may provide market women with a less expensive coping 
strategy in terms of transaction costs. Second, providing market women with access to formal, 
reliable,  long-term  financial  services  may  assist  them  to  permanently  raise  their  working 
capital. This may enable them to better cope with risk and to overcome the poverty trap, while 
at the same time the living standard of their household may rise. Third, the research findings 
suggest that the maintenance of informal credit networks may be used as an alternative to 
titled credit security in formal microfinance programs as it indicates market women’s social 
capital and success in trade.  
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Appendix 
Table 1:  Education Indicators by Gender in the Northern Region 
  Literacy Rate  
(in %) 
Primary School 
Enrollment (in %) 
Secondary School 
Enrollment (in %) 
Male  24.8  43.4  35.7  Gender 
Female  9.3  36  21.3 
(Source: Government Statistical Service 2001) 
 
Table 2:  Socio-Economic Inequalities across Ghana’s Regions in the 1990s 









1992  1999  1997  1997 
Western  60  27  28  75 
Central  44  48  36  72 
Greater Accra  26  5  78  70 
Volta  57  38  42  70 
Eastern  48  44  33  78 
Ashanti  41  28  43  72 
Brong Ahafo  65  36  32  72 
Northern  63  69  18  40 
Upper West  88  84  8  45 
Upper East  67  88  20  36 
National  52  40  37  67 
(Source: Stewart and Langer, 2006: 18) 
Poverty line = 900.000 ¢ per adult in constant prices 
 

































































































































































































































Urban  1,848  250  462,000  1.50 €  694,388 € 
Peri-urban  1,564  200  312,000  1.00 €  312,625 €  Region 
Rural  620  100  62,000  0.50 €  1,052 € 
Total  4,032   –   836,000   –   1,008,066 € 
(Source: Ghana Co-Operative Susu Collector's Association 2003: 4) 
*own calculations, based on the official exchange rate of the Ghanaian Cedi as of August 2003 
(9,980 GHC/Euro)   21 
 
Table 4:  Percent Distribution of Urban Households in the Northern Region by 
Characteristics of the Head of Household 
  Percentage of 
Households 
Single  15.5 
Monogamous  43.8 
Polygamous  16.3 
Widowed/Divorced/Separated  24.5 
Marital 
Status 
Total  100.1 
(Source: Government Statistical Service 2001: 73) 
   22 
References 
 
Albanesi, S. and Olivetti, C. (2005) Home Production, Market Production and the Gender Wage Gap: 
Incentives and Expectations. CEPR Discussion Paper Series, 4984. 
Aryeetey, E. and Udry, C. (1995) The Characteristics of Informal Financial Markets in Africa. In 
Conference on African Economic Research ConsortiumKenya. 
Bardhan, P. K. and Udry, C. (1999) Development microeconomics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
New York. 
Barslund, M. and Tarp, F. (2006) Rural Credit in Vietnam. Department of Economics University of 
Copenhagen Discussion Papers, 2. 
Baydas, M. M., Bahloul, Z. and Adams, D. W. (1995) Informal Finance in Egypt: "Banks" within 
Banks. World Development, 23, 651-61. 
Bell, C., Srinivasan, T. N. and Udry, C. (1997) Rationing, Spillover, and Interlinking in Credit 
Markets: The Case of Rural Punjab. Oxford Economic Papers, 49, 557-85. 
Bhalotra, S. (2004) Early Childhood Investments in Human Capital: Parental Resources and 
Preferences. University of Bristol, Department of Economics Discussion Papers, 04/561. 
Boucher, S. and Guirkinger, C. (2005) Risk, Wealth and Sectoral Choice in Rural Credit Markets. 
Browning, M. and Lechene, V. (2001) Caring and Sharing: Tests Between Alternative Models of 
Intra-Household Allocation. University of Copenhagen, Department of Economics Discussion 
Papers Series, 01-07. 
Campbell, J. (1985) Ideology and politics in the markets of Ghana. Canadian Journal of African 
Studies, 19, 423-430. 
Chayanov, A. V. (1966) The Theory of the Peasant Economy. Irwin, Homewood. 
Clark, G. (1989) Money, Sex and Cooking: Manipulation of the Paid/Unpaid Boundary by Asante 
Market Women. In The Social Economy of Consumption, Orlove, B. and Rutz, H. University 
Press of America, Lanham, pp. 323-348. 
Clark, G. (1991) Food traders and food security in Ghana. In The political economy of African famine, 
Downs, R. E., Kerner, D. O. and Reyna, S. P. Gordon and Breach, Philadelphia, Reading, 
Paris, pp. 227-256. 
Clark, G. (1994) Onions are my husband : survival and accumulation by West African market women. 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Clark, G. and Manuh, T. (1991) Women Traders in Ghana and the Structural Adjustment Program. In 
Structural Adjustment and African Women Farmers, Gladwin, C. H. University of Florida 
Press, Gainesville, pp. 217-36. 
Dinan, C. (1977) Pragmatists or Feminists? The Professional 'Single' Women of Accra, Ghana. 
Cahiers D'Etudes Africaines, 17, 155-76. 
Geertz, C. (1962) The Rotating Credit Association: A "Middle Rung" in Development. Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, 10, 249-54. 
Ghana Co-Operative Susu Collector's Association (2003) GCSCA Strategy 2004-2006. GCSCA, 
Accra. 
Girtler, R. (2001) Methoden der Feldforschung. Böhlau, Köln, Weimar, Wien. 
Gosling, A. and Karagiannaki, E. (2004) Intra-Household Allocation and the Living Standards of the 
Elderly in Greece. CEPR Discussion Paper Series, 4776. 
Government Statistical Service (2001) Core Welfare Indicator Questionnaire (CWIQ) Survey 1997. 
Government Statistical Service, Accra. 
Hart, K. (1973) Informal income opportunities and urban employment in Ghana. The Journal of 
Modern African Studies, 11, 61-89. 
Jain, S. and Mansuri, G. (2003) A Little at a Time: The Use of Regularly Scheduled Repayments in 
Microfinance Programs. Journal of Development Economics, 72, 253-79. 
Kochar, A. (1997) An Empirical Investigation of Rationing Constraints in Rural Credit Markets in 
India. Journal of Development Economics, 53, 339-71. 
Liu, J.-L. and Hsu, C.-C. (2004) Economies of scale, gender discrimination, and cost of children. 
Applied Economics Letters, 11, 377-382.   23 
Malinowski, B. (1922) Argonauts of the Western Pacific: An Account of Native Enterprise and 
Adventure in the Archipelagoes of Melanesian New Guinea. Routledge, London. 
Manuh, T. (1994) Ghana: Women in the Public and Informal Sectors under the Economic Recovery 
Programme. In Mortgaging Women's Lives: Feminist Critiques of Structural Adjustment, 
Sparr, P. Zed Books, London, pp. 61-77. 
McKay, A. and Aryeetey, E. (2004) Operationalising Pro-poor Growth: A Country Case Study on 
Ghana. 
Mushinski, D. W. (1999) An Analysis of Offer Functions of Banks and Credit Unions in Guatemala. 
Journal of Development Studies, 36, 88-112. 
Robertson, C. (1976) Ga women and socioeconomic change in Accra, Ghana. In Women in Africa: 
Studies in social and economic Change, Hafkin, N. J. and Bay, E. G. Stanford University 
Press, Stanford, pp. 111-133. 
Robertson, C. (1983) The Death of Makola Market and Other Tragedies. Canadian Journal of African 
Studies, 17, 469-495. 
Robertson, C. (1995) Comparative Advantage: Women in Trade in Accra, Ghana, and Nairobi, Kenya. 
In African Market Women and Economic Power: The Role of Women in African Economic 
Development, House-Midamba, B. and Ekechi, F. Greenwood Press, Westport, pp. 99-120. 
Rocksloh-Papendieck, B. (1992) Urbane Subsistenzproduktion: Die Kenkeyfrauen in Ghana. In 
Entwicklungsprozesse und Geschlechterverhältnisse, Rott, R. Breitenbach Publishers, 
Saarbrücken, pp. 223-242. 
Sahlins, M. D. (1974) Stone Age Economics. Tavistock, London. 
Sanderatne, N. (2003) Informal Finance in Transition. Sri Lanka Economic Journal, 4, 31-57. 
Steel, W. F. and Andah, D. O. (2003) Rural and Micro Finance Regulation in Ghana: Implications for 
Development and Performance of the Industry. Africa Region Working Paper Series, 49. 
Stewart, F. and Langer, A. (2006) Horizontal Inequalities: Explaining persistence and change. First 
PEGNet Workshop: Poverty Reduction, Equity, and Growth: New Issues and Findings, Kiel. 
Suen, W., Chan, W. and Zhang, J. (2003) Marital transfer and intra-household allocation: A Nash-
bargaining analysis. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 52, 133 -146. 
Tamale Municipal Assembly (2003) Medium Term Development Plan Under the Ghana Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (2002-2004). Tamale Municipal Assembly, Tamale. 
Tsai, K. S. (2004) Imperfect Substitutes: The Local Political Economy of Informal Finance and 
Microfinance in Rural China and India. World Development, 32, 1487-1507. 
Udry, C. (1990) Credit Markets in Northern Nigeria: Credit as Insurance in a Rural Economy. World 
Bank Economic Review, 4, 251-69. 
Udry, C. and Conley, T. G. (2004) Social Networks in Ghana. Yale University Economic Growth 
Center Working Paper Series, 888. 
Wallerstein, I. (1984) Household structures and labor-force formation in the capitalist world economy. 
In Households and the World Economy, Smith, J., Wallerstein, I. and Evers, H.-D. Sage, 
Beverly Hills. 
Westwood, S. (1984) 'Fear Woman': Property and Modes of Production in Urban Ghana. In Women 
and Property, Women as Property, Hirschon, R. Croom Helm and St. Martin's Press, London, 
Canbera, New York, pp. 140-157. 
Wilk, R. R. (1989) Decision Making and Resource Flows Within the Household: Beyond the Black 
Box. In The Household Economy: Reconsidering the Domestic Mode of Production, Wilk, R. 
R. Westview Press, Boulder, San Francisco, London, pp. 23-54. 
Wilk, R. R. (1990) Household Ecology: Decision Making and Resource Flows. In The Ecosystem 
Approach in Anthropology: From Concept To Practice, Moran, E. University of Michigan 
Press, Ann Arbor, pp. 323-356. 
Wilk, R. R. (1993) Altruism and Self-Interest: Towards an Anthropological Theory of Decision 
Making. Research in Economic Anthropology, 14, 191–212. 
 